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LAWYER CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND SOPHISTICATED CLIENTS 
 
Kevin C. McMunigal* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
I like many things about Professor Milan Markovic’s article on which I have 
been invited to comment. He has chosen an interesting, important, and timely topic 
and provides a detailed and persuasive critique of the ability of sophisticated 
clients to understand and protect themselves from the dangers presented by 
attorney conflicts of interest. I found particularly interesting his examination of the 
psychological issues that surround a lawyer obtaining a client’s consent to a 
conflict of interest. 
I devote this commentary, though, to two aspects of Professor Markovic’s 
article I find puzzling. The first is the modesty of the remedial measures he 
proposes. The second is his apparent ambivalence about whether the Sullivan 
lawyers acted unethically. 
 
II.  ARE HIS REMEDIES ADEQUATE? 
 
I agree with Professor Markovic that lawyer conflicts of interest pose serious 
risks to the representation of clients. I also agree that clients—both sophisticated 
and unsophisticated—have limited ability to evaluate and protect themselves from 
these risks. But Professor Markovic does not pursue the logic of his analysis to the 
conclusions it seems to compel. 
He proposes two relatively modest language changes, one to Model Rule 
1.7(b) and the other to the Comment to Model Rule 1.7.1 Replacing Model Rule 
1.7(b)’s “competent and diligent representation” language is a sound suggestion 
because that phrase is misleading. But I would not replace it with the language 
Professor Markovic proposes about meeting a client’s objectives. Many lawyers 
who provide excellent representation fail to meet their client’s objectives. Doesn’t 
virtually every criminal defendant, for example, have the objective of avoiding 
conviction and imprisonment? Many defense lawyers fail every day to achieve this 
client objective while nonetheless providing effective and ethical representation to 
their clients.  
His proposed additions to the Comment to Model Rule 1.7 state that a lawyer 
“shall regularly consult with the client as to the conflict of interest’s effect on the 
representation.” 2  This language appears—incorrectly—to assume that it is 
permissible for a lawyer to allow a conflict to have any effect on representation. 
																																																								
* © 2013 Kevin C. McMunigal, Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. 
1 Milan Markovic, The Sophisticates: Conflicted Representation and the Lehman 
Bankruptcy, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 903, 942. 
2 Id. at 942. 
214 UTAH LAW REVIEW ONLAW [VOL. 1 
	
Professor Markovic’s proposed changes to the Comment also include clarifying 
that a client can revoke consent to a conflict as the representation develops.3 Such 
clarification is a sound proposal, though it does not seem to me to add anything 
beyond what other Model Rules already require. 
In sum, his proposals strike me as not offering much of a change from what 
the Model Rules already require. And both his proposals seem far too modest to 
remedy the scope and seriousness of the problems he vividly describes. 
Lawyer conflicts of interest create perverse incentives that threaten to impair 
the lawyer’s representation of a client. Professor Markovic points out that, for a 
number of reasons, lawyers are unlikely to resist these incentives.4 Psychological 
factors such as chronic overconfidence, underestimation of the dangers conflicts 
pose, and the phenomenon of “moral licensing” support this pessimistic 
assessment.5 A lawyer’s economic incentive to not turn away business and lack of 
deterrence due to the low probability of disciplinary sanctions increase the chances 
of a lawyer succumbing to the perverse incentives conflicts create. 6  And, he 
explains, clients—even sophisticated clients—are not typically able to protect 
themselves from the risks posed by lawyer conflicts.7 Clients often lack sufficient 
information, tend to overestimate a lawyer’s ability to resist the perverse incentives 
conflicts create, and are likely to be misled by a lawyer understating the risks 
posed by conflicts.8 
So, Professor Markovic tells us, conflicts pose serious risks, lawyers are 
unlikely to resist these risks, and clients are unable to protect themselves. Given 
this ominous confluence, why does Professor Markovic not propose more drastic 
remedies than he does? 
 
A.  Eliminating Prospective Waivers 
 
I wonder, for example, why he does not recommend, as others have,9 entirely 
eliminating prospective waivers by sophisticated clients. He criticizes such waivers 
and challenges the notion that sophisticated clients are able to protect themselves 
from the risks they pose. He warns that “Lehman’s experience should . . . cast 
some doubt” on prospective waivers10 and that critics of such waivers “may well 
																																																								
3 Id. 
4 See id. at 914–22, 929–32. 
5 Id. at 916 (citing Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in 
Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 79 (2009)). 
6 See id. at 931–32. 
7 Id. at 923, 937. 
8 Id. at 915–16. 
9 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, All’s O.K. Between Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule 
on Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701 (2001); Lawrence J. Fox, 
The Gang of Thirty-Three: Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client Loyalty, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 567 (2012),	http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1063.pdf. 
10 Markovic, supra note 1, at 938. 
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be correct.” 11  But, for some reason, Professor Markovic stops short of 
recommending that ethics codes ban prospective waivers. He proposes, instead, 
additions to Model Rule 1.7’s Comment clarifying clients’ right to revoke such 
waivers. 
Clarifying a client’s right to revocation may be a positive step. A client’s 
decision about revocation of a conflict consent obviously takes place further along 
in a representation than the initial decision to consent, so at least in theory more 
information should be available to the client for use in assessing the risks posed by 
the conflict. But other problems that Professor Markovic argues undermine a 
client’s ability to make a sound decision about consenting to a conflict in the first 
place are likely also to undermine the client’s ability to make a sound decision 
about revocation. A revocation right just gives a client a second crack at making a 
decision that Professor Markovic shows us the client is in a poor position to make. 
Consider in the context of revocation the following problems. Given a 
lawyer’s economic incentive to not turn away business, is the lawyer likely to fully 
inform a client of the facts relevant to a revocation decision? Given the 
overconfidence of lawyers in their ability to resist the dangers conflicts pose, is a 
lawyer likely to adequately advise a client making a revocation decision about the 
dangers a conflict poses? If clients tend to overestimate the ability of their lawyers 
to resist the perverse incentives created by conflicts, won’t that tendency 
undermine the client’s ability to make a good decision about revoking consent? If 
the fact that a lawyer has disclosed a conflict tends to mislead a client into 
overestimating the chances that the lawyer will resist the incentives created by the 
conflict, won’t this psychological tendency lead the client to make a bad judgment 
about revoking a prior consent? 
The costs of switching lawyers partway through a representation are also 
likely to undermine the effectiveness of revocation as a remedial device by 
discouraging clients from using it. A client is likely to resist switching lawyers 
because she will often have to pay to get a new lawyer up to speed. The client may 
also fear that switching lawyers during a representation will decrease the chances 
that the representation will be successful. 
In sum, revocation does not seem nearly as proportionate a remedy to the 
many serious problems Professor Markovic points out in his article as eliminating 
prospective waivers altogether. 
 
B.  Why Allow Clients to Consent to Conflicts? 
 
Given, as Professor Markovic informs us, the pervasiveness and seriousness 
of the problems that plague clients consenting to lawyer conflicts, I also wonder 
why Professor Markovic does not propose that ethics codes do away entirely with 
allowing clients to consent to lawyer conflicts of interest. In short, why not make 
all conflicts that pose significant risk to a representation—conflicts that trigger 
Model Rule 1.7(a)(2)—unconsentable? If lawyers are unlikely to resist the risks 
																																																								
11 Id. 
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conflicts pose and clients are unable to understand or prevent their lawyers from 
succumbing to these risks, and, as Professor Markovic argues, there is a “societal 
interest” in unimpaired representation of clients,12 why should legal ethics codes 
ever allow clients to consent to conflicts of interest? 
The Model Rules currently do prohibit lawyers from obtaining client consent 
in some conflict of interest situations. Model Rule 1.8(j), for example, barring a 
lawyer from having “sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual 
relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship 
commenced,” contains no client consent provision.13 Similarly, Model Rule 1.8(c), 
prohibiting a lawyer from drafting an instrument, such as a will, that gives the 
lawyer a substantial gift, has no client consent provision.14 Because these conflict 
situations pose such high risks and present such difficult detection and proof 
problems, the Model Rules do not allow clients to consent. Given the high level of 
risk as well as the detection and proof problems all conflicts of interest create, why 
not just eliminate the ability of clients to consent to lawyer conflicts? 
As his title suggests, one of Professor Markovic’s primary points is that 
sophisticated clients have limited ability to understand and protect themselves 
from the risks posed by lawyer conflicts of interest. He makes this point 
persuasively. But the problems that hamper sophisticated clients in making sound 
decisions regarding lawyer conflicts of interest also hamper unsophisticated 
clients. Each of the problems he describes applies equally, or with greater force, to 
unsophisticated clients when dealing with lawyer conflicts. As Professor Markovic 
acknowledges, “all clients, regardless of their level of sophistication, may have 
difficulty assessing the significance of attorney’s conflicts”15 and “[c]lients of all 
levels of sophistication deserve to be represented by attorneys who are entirely 
dedicated to protecting their clients’ interests.”16 
If sophisticated clients—repeat players who are often advised by in-house 
lawyers about conflicts—are unable to evaluate and protect themselves from the 
dangers posed by lawyer conflicts, does it not then follow that clients who are not 
repeat players and lack the advice of an independent lawyer are even less able to 
evaluate and protect themselves from lawyer conflicts than sophisticated clients? 
Thus, unsophisticated clients need and deserve an even greater level of protection. 
Is it not the logical conclusion to Professor Markovic’s critique, then, that Model 
Rule 1.7 and Model Rule 1.9 should be modified to eliminate any provision that 
allows clients—whether sophisticated or unsophisticated—to consent to lawyer 
conflicts of interest? 
 
III.  DID THE SULLIVAN LAWYERS ACT UNETHICALLY? 
 
																																																								
12 Id. at 944. 
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2009).   
14 Id. R. 1.8(c). 
15 Markovic, supra note 1, at 904 (emphasis added). 
16 Id. at 945 (emphasis added). 
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Professor Markovic appears conflicted at many points in his article about 
whether to fault the Sullivan lawyers. The overall thrust and tone of Professor 
Markovic’s article strike me as clearly critical of the Sullivan lawyers. Indeed, he 
presents their representation of Lehman as “a cautionary tale for both attorneys and 
their clients,”17 illustrating the need for modification of legal ethics codes. But he 
seems ambivalent about (1) whether conflicts impaired the Sullivan lawyers’ 
representation of Lehman and (2) whether the Sullivan lawyers violated any ethics 
rules. 
 
A.  An Impaired Representation? 
 
Professor Markovic concludes at several points that the Sullivan lawyers 
allowed conflicting interests to impair their representation of Lehman. He states, 
for example, at one point that “there is strong reason to believe that” conflicts of 
interest “undermined the representation.”18 He devotes a section of his article to 
discussing “three specific conflicts of interest that impacted the representation that 
Sullivan provided to Lehman.” 19  In the next paragraph, he writes that these 
conflicts “compromised the representation that Sullivan could provide to 
Lehman.”20 At another point in his article, he states, “Sullivan had a conflict of 
interest that materially limited the representation of Lehman.”21 
Professor Markovic, though, at other places in his article, expresses a more 
guarded and qualified position about whether conflicts impaired the Lehman 
representation. Here he writes that the Sullivan lawyers’ conflicts may have or 
appeared to have impaired the representation. For example, he tells us that “three 
conflicts of interest . . . may have interfered with Sullivan’s representation of 
Lehman”22 and “may have impacted the representation.”23 At other points he states, 
“Sullivan’s relationship with Lehman’s competitors, as well as Lehman acquirers, 
appeared to compromise its representation”24 and “appeared to affect Sullivan’s 
representation.”25 In a similar vein, he writes that “[t]here is some evidence to 
suggest that Sullivan failed to fully protect Lehman.”26  
So Professor Markovic leaves me wondering: Does he believe that the 
Sullivan conflicts actually impaired the Lehman representation? Or does he think 
the conflicts may have or appeared to have impaired the representation? In my 
opinion, the facts recounted in Professor Markovic’s article are insufficient to 
demonstrate that Sullivan’s representation was impaired and thus unethical. More 
																																																								
17 Id. at 906. 
18 Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
19 Id. at 916 (emphasis added). 
20 Id. (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 920 (emphasis added). 
22 Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
23 Id. at 929 (emphasis added). 
24 Id. at 905 (emphasis added). 
25 Id. at 910 (emphasis added). 
26 Id. at 925. 
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information would be needed from both Lehman and the Sullivan lawyers to 
resolve these questions. 
Professor Markovic’s apparent ambivalence here may be a product of the 
limitations on the information available to him. He acknowledges as much when 
he says at the outset that it is “impossible to know all of the particulars” of the 
representation. 27  Despite his impressively detailed account of the Lehman 
bankruptcy and his familiarity with what has been written about it, Professor 
Markovic appears to encounter in his case study precisely the sort of monitoring 
problems that clients and the bar face in detecting and proving whether a conflict 
of interest impaired a representation. 
Such monitoring difficulties are a primary reason we have conflict of interest 
rules. We do not want lawyers to operate in situations that pose high risks of 
impaired representation when the client and the bar have limited ability to detect 
and prove whether such impairment actually occurs. These monitoring problems 
provide a powerful reason to curtail the ability of lawyers to seek client consent to 
conflicts of interest. 
 
B.  Did the Sullivan Lawyers Act Unethically?  
 
Professor Markovic’s numerous statements that conflicting interests 
“undermined,” “compromised,” and “materially limited” Sullivan’s representation 
of Lehman, if accurate, would indicate that Sullivan failed to adhere to its ethical 
obligations. But despite these pejorative assessments, Professor Markovic goes out 
of his way elsewhere in the article to avoid giving a negative conclusion about the 
Sullivan lawyers’ ethics. He writes that “Sullivan undoubtedly endeavored to 
represent Lehman to the best of its ability, and the purpose of this Article is not to 
determine whether Sullivan violated professional standards with regard to attorney 
conflicts of interest.”28 Elsewhere he writes, “there is no reason to believe that 
Sullivan did not, on the whole, represent Lehman competently and diligently.”29 
As I stated above, I think the facts recounted by Professor Markovic are not 
sufficient to demonstrate whether Sullivan’s representation was impaired and thus 
unethical. What I find troubling, though, is Professor Markovic’s apparent view 
that an impaired representation is not necessarily an unethical representation. In 
other words, if he thinks the representation of Lehman was “undermined,” 
“compromised,” and “materially limited” by Sullivan’s conflicts of interest, I am at 
a loss to see how he can conclude that the Sullivan lawyers adhered to their ethical 
obligations and represented Lehman “competently and diligently.” Even his more 
qualified statements—that the conflicts may have impaired or appear to have 
impaired the representation—are at odds with his statement that “there is no reason 
to believe that Sullivan did not, on the whole, represent Lehman competently and 
																																																								
27 Id. at 905. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 917 (emphasis added). 
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diligently.”30 If the conflicts appear to have impaired the representation, does that 
not provide reason to believe that Sullivan failed to represent Lehman competently 
and diligently? 
The only way I can see that Professor Markovic could conclude that 
representation impaired by conflicts of interest is not unethical would be to view 
Lehman as having consented to such impaired representation. Professor Markovic 
tells his readers quite candidly that he does not know what sort of consent Lehman 
gave, but that he assumes Sullivan obtained from Lehman a prospective conflicts 
waiver.31  The incongruity between describing a representation as impaired but 
nonetheless ethical—as well as some other passages in Professor Markovic’s 
article—suggest to me that he believes that a client’s consent to a conflict of 
interest necessarily entails the client consenting to impaired representation. For 
example, his proposed language for the Comment to Model Rule 1.7, requiring 
lawyers to “regularly consult with their clients as to a conflict of interest’s effect 
on a representation,” appears to assume that it is permissible for a lawyer to allow 
a conflict to have an effect on a representation.32 
If this is in fact Professor Markovic’s view, he is, in my estimation, mistaken. 
When a client consents to a concurrent conflict of interest, the client gives up the 
protections afforded by Model Rule 1.7, but not the protections afforded by other 
ethics rules, such as Model Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.6. So if, for example, 
Sullivan obtained critical information from Merrill that was not protected by a 
confidentiality obligation to Merrill, Model Rule 1.4 on client communication 
would have required the Sullivan lawyers to disclose that information to Lehman 
notwithstanding any conflict consent given by Lehman. 33  And if the Sullivan 
lawyers failed to diligently investigate Barclays as a potential Lehman buyer, they 
would have violated both Model Rule 1.1 on competence and Model Rule 1.3 on 
diligence, again notwithstanding any conflict consent by Lehman.34 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Notwithstanding the questions raised above, Professor Markovic’s article 
makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate about prospective waivers, 
conflicts of interest, and how ethics codes should treat both sophisticated and 
unsophisticated clients. It should also stimulate public conversation and concern 
about the dangers conflicts of interest pose to the health and integrity of our 
financial system. 
																																																								
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 905. 
32 Id. at 943.  
33 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009).   
34 See id. R. 1.1; id. R. 1.3.  
